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Abstract  
While urban heat networks are established components of energy systems in several 
European countries, district heating (DH) serves only around 1% of the UK’s space 
and hot water heat demand. Many of the factors relevant to Scandinavian 20th century 
development of DH (resource efficiency, affordable heat, regeneration, local revenue 
generation) inform contemporary UK plans, but climate protection policies are giving 
new impetus to low carbon energy innovation. A number of municipal authorities are 
actively developing DH projects, though in a context which differs significantly from 
those which supported earlier extensive innovation in Europe. Key differences include 
limited local authority powers, resources, and capacities; limited supportive 
institutions; and tensions between local initiatives and the global scale of key energy 
actors. Therefore, in spite of the maturity of DH technologies, and some supportive 
UK and Scottish governance measures, deployment of DH in the UK (and several 
other countries) represents a significant collective action problem. Using new 
qualitative data on UK, Dutch and Norwegian DH cases, we examine the local 
governance solutions and the prospects for effective governance of UK heat networks.  
 
Key Words Governance, district energy, district heating, low carbon energy, cities, 
sustainability, socio-technical innovation. 
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Multi-level Governance of Socio-Technical Innovation:  
the Case of District Heating in the UK 
David Hawkey and Janette Webb1, University of Edinburgh 
1. Introduction and Research Themes: Energy Systems and Concepts of Governance 
Accelerating global demand for energy, anxieties about security and cost, and 
scientific evidence of the damaging impacts of fossil fuel combustion, are placing 
innovation in socio-technical infrastructure2 at the heart of public debate. place 
particular emphasis on system-wide innovation. This requires renewal not just of 
energy technologies, but of governance arrangements for supply chains, investment 
and ownership, regulatory frameworks and consumption. The design and coordination 
of adequate policy and resource frameworks, under time constraints, is extremely 
challenging. State, market and civil society actors face unanswered questions about 
governance, including the credibility and legitimacy of priorities for investment, and 
the share of responsibility for costs and benefits. The definition of the ‘problem’ of 
energy system change, and its potential solutions, are not surprisingly subject to 
uncertainty, and marked by anxiety over risks of market and government failures, 
which in turn have material consequences for the cost of capital, and the resulting 
energy systems. 
This paper examines some of the situated practices of governance and innovation in 
distributed energy (DE), particularly that involving heat networks (‘district heating’ 
DH). It aims to give insight into the interactions between local (municipal 
government), energy market, and state government actors in the UK, contextualised 
with reference to European examples from the Netherlands and Norway. Using new 
qualitative data, we examine project development and governance in five localities. 
We draw on the functional Technological Innovation Systems (TIS) model, and the 
multi-level perspective (MLP) on socio-technical transitions, to identify factors which 
account for particular practices of energy governance.  
The main political divide over proposed solutions for low carbon energy systems 
development continues to centre on arguments about the relative effectiveness of 
market mechanisms vs government-led ‘command and control’ planning measures. In 
practice, European institutional arrangements for energy infrastructure are highly 
diverse, ranging from ‘centralised state provision through ministries and state-owned 
companies, local municipalities and private provision’ (Helm, 2010: 9). The variety of 
provision is equaled by variety in financial arrangements, from public to private 
finance, and from franchises to direct asset ownership. A mixed ‘planning and 
markets’ approach is typically used: competition in European energy markets is 
pursued in tandem with policy measures intended to enhance security of supply and 
low carbon transition; market-mechanisms (liberalisation / ‘unbundling’, the EU ETS, 
and variants of carbon incentives and taxes) exist alongside centralised control and 
planning (energy efficiency standards, infrastructure planning and capacity 
mechanisms).  
                                                
1 We wish to thank Dr Mark Winskel for his contribution to early drafts and discussions about case 
study interpretation. 
2 Socio-technical infrastructure is defined here as a combination of knowledge and expertise, material 
technologies, equity and investments. 
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Empirical social science has also long established that the organisation of production 
and consumption is not in practice characterised by a simple dichotomy between 
‘markets’ and ‘hierarchies’, just as it has repeatedly shown the inadequacies of a 
model of organisational conduct derived from the tenets of rational-economic 
individualism (Fligstein and Dauter, 2007; Goffman, 1983; Granovetter, 1985; 
Ostrom, 1990; 2009; Powell, 1990; Sen, 1977; Simon, 1955; Stark, 2009). In this 
context, the concept of governance, although often used only loosely and sometimes 
implicitly, promises an analytical device for bridging between the stark dualism of 
market or hierarchical solutions. Use of the term governance opens up to more 
deliberate and reflexive enquiry the variety of potential solutions to major collective 
action problems, in different political-economic contexts, and at different scales, from 
local to global. When applied to local energy systems innovation, the concept of 
governance places questions of organisational control, distribution of costs and 
benefits, risk and responsibility, explicitly on the agenda for negotiation. It creates 
potential for recognition, and analyses of, the role of diversity, complexity and 
different political values in addressing collective action dilemmas, and the likely 
range of planning and markets, and public and private agents and resources involved. 
Perhaps above all, it enables recognition of the socially- and historically-situated 
qualities of solutions to innovation. Evidence from practice demonstrates that 
circumstances shape actors’ proposed solutions to address complex issues of finance 
and resource allocation, and concerns over accountability, legitimacy, credibility and 
equity (Kern, 2011; Ostrom, 2007).  
Privatised energy markets, which have developed alongside finance capitalism over 
the last 20-30 years, have decisively shaped the political-economic circumstances for 
such systems innovation. With the aim of assuring reliable rates of return through 
controlling risk, and hence lowering the cost of capital, global financial market actors 
have devised increasingly standardised risk assessment instruments to govern 
investments. In seeking to reduce financial risk, such instruments work to 
decontextualise and delocalise investment decisions for systems innovation. Local, 
customised, energy systems, which do not fit dominant system ‘templates’ are marked 
out as riskier, making a ‘business case’ for infrastructure investment hard to establish. 
Given the local and contingent qualities of DH, with high upfront investment, long-
term payback, and risks regarded as hard to mitigate through standard means, the 
resulting increase in capital costs will limit the financial viability of projects. Bridging 
the gap between rationalised finance models and local political and economic interests 
in DE projects requires considerable governance capacity, which will have high 
transaction costs for organisations with limited resources. Inter-organisational 
governance of the kind often entailed in DH systems is particularly challenging and 
prone to recurring crises, with notable disadvantages including ‘management 
complexities, financial and organizational risks, the risk of becoming dependent on 
the partner or power imbalance, partial loss of decision autonomy, and culture clashes’ 
(Sundberg and Sjodin, 2003: 492). New DH networks may be increasingly 
disadvantaged, relative to other energy investments, unless the cost-benefit calculus is 
changed by introduction of supportive regulatory measures. 
2. Applying Theories of Innovation Governance to DH 
Innovation systems and transition theories have been informed by sociological 
analyses of science and technology, and actor network theory, as well as having 
foundations in evolutionary and environmental economics. The MLP established in 
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the 1990s (Kemp et al, 1998; Geels, 2004) sought to address criticisms of transition 
theory as inappropriately ‘micro-social’ in focus. It conceives of system transition as 
taking place in relation to a nested innovation hierarchy of niche, regime and 
landscape (Geels and Schot, 2007). The regime represents the meso-level of 
institutions and organisations, where ‘normal’ means of organising societal functions 
such as provision of energy are established; it is regarded as changing incrementally 
and in path-dependent ways. The regime represents the accumulated knowledge, 
investments, public and private infrastructures and norms constituting established 
practice (Smith et al, 2010). In common with other recent innovation systems theories, 
the MLP conceives of radical change as most likely to arise from niche innovations, 
which must gain sufficient momentum to displace an established regime. Both niches 
and regimes are treated as situated in a macro-level landscape of societal and physical 
processes, encompassing environmental and financial resources, as well as social 
movements, politics, global economic organisation, scientific knowledge, 
demography, and so on.  
The MLP is powerful in providing a means of conceptualising and ordering 
complexity, and in providing an analytical means of tracing alternative pathways to 
transition, but there are also questions about its explanatory power. One of these 
concerns the extent to which insight into innovation governance for socio-technically 
embedded and coupled systems such as DH requires analysis of the relevance of 
particularities of place and spatial scale. Hodson and Marvin (2010) argue that place 
has frequently remained implicit in research drawing on the MLP, with the 
background assumption that regimes operate at the scale of a country or geographical 
region. The specificity of place, given different resources, histories and cultures, 
forces researchers into interaction with the multiple levels of governance practice, and 
power relations, and their variable geometry. It highlights concerns about capacity 
and capability to manage system innovation and questions of purpose, intent and 
motivation.  Smith et al (2010) argue that ‘places bring meaningful historical and 
social narratives into the realisation of abstract goals. They generate regionally 
relevant visions whose symbolism and specificity carry greater moral authority as a 
result’ (p. 444).  
An alternative perspective is provided by Winskel (2011) who suggests that the MLP 
has been overly-influenced by normative concerns with advancing radical sustainable 
technologies, which are expected to thrive predominantly in protected niches, before 
becoming a motor for meso-level regime change. The ‘niche’ has been treated, 
predominantly, as situated at the micro-level of interaction. He regards the social 
constructivist analysis of systemic innovation as resulting in over-emphasis on micro-
social niches as engines of system change. This risks a ‘one best way’ account of 
innovation as a necessarily disruptive process, entailing the break-up of incumbent 
regime authority.  Consequently the potential for regime reform to produce radical 
transformation has been downplayed. This has resulted in less recognition of, and 
insight into, the roles of the incumbent regime in innovation, and of non-radical 
innovation i.e. based on recombinations of existing technologies, or of incremental 
innovations which may exert considerable cumulative effect over time (Smith et al, 
2005; Winskel, 2011). Given high economic and political stakes, Winskel implies that 
claims about the moral and symbolic power of associations with place are similarly 
flawed by social constructivist assumptions, and are unlikely to outweigh concerns 
about energy affordability and supply security, framed by the cost-benefit calculus of 
a dominant regime. In addition it might be argued that, during periods of major 
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political economic uncertainty, as at present, the concept of a singular stable and self-
perpetuating regime under-recognises the tensions and sources of schism within and 
among regime institutions, or the potential for a plurality of ‘partial’ regimes to be in 
operation, with different goals and assumptions. Such tensions may work as catalysts 
to socio-technical innovation at a range of scales, as suggested by economic sociology 
analyses of the productivity of intra- and inter-organisational dissonance and 
discrepancy in assumptions and understandings (Boltanski and Thevenot, 2006; Stark, 
2009).  
Hence we aim, as advocated by Smith et al (2010), to analyse some of the inter-
linkages between ‘actors and institutions of markets, technology and societal demand 
with those of market regulation, innovation policy and environmental governance’ 
(p.446). We seek however to avoid the pitfalls of ex-ante pathway prototypes. We 
treat the concepts of micro, meso and macro levels as analytically useful distinctions, 
which may however inadvertently obscure the interlocking and shifting qualities of 
relationships between actors, many of whom have a number of identities in, for 
example, localities, business, government, research and campaigning. Such a 
perspective does not imply an inevitable focus on micro-level or niche-led action as 
the major means of system innovation. Analyses of the Dutch energy transition 
project, designed initially as a democratically-informed and participative platform for 
innovation, for example, have provided insight into structural dynamics of power 
relations. Incumbent actors played a dominant part in setting direction and framing 
the evaluation of costs and benefits of technologies (Hendriks, 2008; Kemp, Rotmans 
et al 2007; Kern and Smith, 2008). Governance of innovation is irreducibly political 
(Meadowcroft, 2009); it is not designed in a social vacuum and its agents are complex 
entities, not atomistic individuals; it proceeds from current policies, ‘sunk investments’ 
and incumbent interests. 
3. Using the TIS Model to Structure Data Collection 
For data collection purposes, the functional Technology Innovation Systems model 
(TIS) (Bergek et al, 2008; Hekkert et al., 2007;  Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011) was 
adapted to the socio-technical DH network. TIS categories provide a means of 
identifying project development problems, and the resources, institutions and actors 
which can be recruited to solve those problems. Adapting the TIS categories to DH 
projects requires recognition that DH is locally bounded by area-based heat demand, 
and the technology is spatially anchored in evolving patterns of demand. Systems rely 
on long-term interdependencies between developers and subscribers, and local 
authorities typically play a critical role. Second, DH is a relatively well-established 
technology; hence our focus is on deployment and organisational innovation rather 
than technological innovation per se. Third the concept of “Entrepreneurial 
Experimentation” is flexibly interpreted. Rather than the “point source” model of 
innovation implied by the term “entrepreneurial”, suggesting individuals or 
organisations making high risk investments in the hope of extraordinary returns, we 
emphasise the socio-technical “experimentation” aspect of the category. The need to 
coordinate a wide range of stakeholders, particularly subscribers who make a long-
term commitment to the system (either through long term contracts and/or due to the 
cost barrier associated with switching to another energy supply) and forego access to 
retail competition, means that developing a DH network is rarely comprehensible in 
the context of conventional entrepreneurship, or undermining incumbent interests. 
While new DH networks present a series of risks to those involved in their 
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development (financial, political, technological, etc.) they are rarely undertaken 
because the risk profile is matched by large financial returns. However, the space 
available for new activities (generating new forms of knowledge and other 
externalities which expand that space) is an important consideration. Fourth, rather 
than a macro-scale interpretation of the search processes which structure the selection 
environment for different investment opportunities, and hence technologies (Hekkert 
et al., 2007), we find the function a useful category for exploring factors influencing 
the “search” carried out by local actors and decisions (including investment decisions) 
at a local level. In part, this is because DH is a mature technology and so falls outside 
the purview of investors searching for opportunities to establish a strong position in 
an evolving energy system. 
4. DH Governance Arrangements in European Context: Case Studies in Norway, 
Netherlands and UK. 
District heating (DH) is a well-established technology in a number of European 
countries, but serves only around 1% of the UK’s space heating and hot water demand. 
Historically in the UK it has been marginalised by a relatively cheap, plentiful and 
secure supply of North Sea gas, combined with a short-term least cost calculus in 
price-competitive electricity markets, resulting in the ‘dash for gas’ in electricity 
generation and reliance on individual building heating systems. Gas-fired CHP has 
not been prioritised, despite recognised energy saving, and social and environmental, 
benefits (Kelly and Pollitt, 2010). The absence of a state body with direct 
responsibility for heat supply, which could for example identify zones for DH, and 
regulate and license suppliers, has added to relative disadvantage for both CHP and 
DH (Hawkey, 2011; Russell, 1993).  
In western European countries (notably Denmark, Finland, Germany, The 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden), DH has developed under a variety of 
institutional arrangements, but two factors - the scope and power of local authorities 
(LAs), including budgetary control, and significant public sector control over energy - 
have been particularly important historically. The dominant governance model has 
centred on locally-owned energy companies, where the municipal authority is at least 
a signifcant shareholder, if not sole owner (Ericson, 2009; EuroHeat & Power, 2009). 
LAs have played a critical role by virtue of: 
• their capacity (as municipal agents) to map the distribution of heat demand and 
supply in an area and to plan energy (heat and power) supply to optimise fuel and 
infrastructure efficiency;  
• their capacity to coordinate the development of heat networks with other energy 
and utility systems; 
• the significant heat loads controlled; 
• the perceived reduction in risks of subscription to DH, associated with lock-in to a 
monopoly heat supplier; 
• their responsibility to balance societal well-being, including affordable warmth, 
against financial costs, including cross-subsidisation of heat networks through 
income from other public services. 
The broadly-based social-democratic welfare consensus established in significant 
parts of post-war western Europe supported equitable access to integrated, and in 
some instances cross-subsidised, public services including energy. In the last 20-30 
HAWKEY AND WEBB, DISTRICT HEATING 
 8 
years however on-going liberalisation of energy markets, combined with rising public 
debt, has resulted in some dismantling of locally-controlled energy services and 
increasing concentration of ownership by transnational utilities. In countries such as 
Sweden, this has brought greater fragmentation of services and evidence of rising 
heating costs (Rutherford, 2008). Whether shaped by political economy, or plentiful 
supply of resources, or their interaction, goals in a privatised energy system are 
necessarily defined in commercial terms; social obligations are limited, and political 
coordination over energy efficiency, security and affordability must be structured 
around the institutions of private-public partnerships, which have become a defining 
feature of neo-liberal governance. 
4.1 BERGEN, Norway: from corporate experiments to multi-level governance and 
municipal leadership. 
The form and governance of DH development in Bergen can be traced to state 
instruments requiring recovery of minimum levels of energy from waste, allied to 
corporate strategic interests in energy system development. Early local level 
governance was weak, and the scheme relied on commercial partnership between an 
electricity utility and a waste management company. Limited state-level regulation 
meant that the development pathway had to be newly devised. More recent proactive 
local governance has been driven by state and international climate protection 
measures, and the perceived success and momentum of the scheme. 
The DH network is a joint venture between BKK (Norway’s second largest electric 
utility) and BIR (the waste management company). The local authority (LA), Bergen 
Kommune, does however own shares in both companies, but under the Norwegian 
model of energy market liberalisation LAs do not use share ownership to pursue 
social goals. In 1996 BIR obtained a license to construct and operate a waste 
incinerator roughly 12km from central Bergen. The license stipulated that a minimum 
of 50% of recoverable energy must be used. Although BIR considered options for 
industrial use of the heat, a DH application proved more economically attractive. The 
joint venture, BKK Varme, was established to construct and operate a DH network, 
purchasing heat from BIR’s waste incinerator and retailing it to consumers. From 
BKK’s perspective, DH drew on their energy retail expertise, but also complemented 
‘regime’ electricity market structures by relieving strain on electricity networks 
caused by new electric heating developments. The understanding of DH as improving 
network resilience and limiting costs is common among electricity suppliers. Indeed 
Norsk Fjernvarme (the Norwegian District Heating Association) was initially made 
up predominantly of electricity companies. Reflecting BKK’s interests and retail 
expertise, BKK Varme was established to give BKK overall control through a 51% 
shareholding. 
Other local circumstances facilitating development of the DH network included the 
construction of a motorway running into the city and passing near the incinerator, 
allowing BKK Varme to coordinate DH planning with transport infrastructure 
permissions already granted. Bergen’s built form also allowed easy identification of 
buildings likely to be suitable for DH connection (pre-1960s buildings predate the 
general electrification of heating in Norway, and so usually have water-borne, oil-
fired heating). 
HAWKEY AND WEBB, DISTRICT HEATING 
 9 
In a context where climate protection policy has gained increasing prominence, state 
governance, which seeks to integrate social, economic and environmental and criteria 
for energy systems, has proved supportive of locally-devised solutions for DH. State 
licensing of DH systems above 10MW regularises development by imposing data 
requirements, appraisal methodologies, heat tariff limits and service reliability and 
consumer protection measures. Project developers submit detailed plans, including 
evidence of subscriber commitment to connect, before a license is granted. Combined 
environmental and socioeconomic indicators (using open calculations and 
assumptions) are used to judge whether the development is “socially rational and 
environmentally acceptable” relative to other heat solutions (NVE, 2009). In TIS 
terms, the framework constrains the scope of DH governance models, without being 
overly-determining, and mitigates local problems by increasing legitimacy among 
stakeholders and subscribers. Development of DH in Bergen predated even more 
supportive state governance. Significant new resources have been made available, 
including advanced technical support from the Norwegian Water Resources and 
Energy Directorate, state funded grants covering up to 20% of capital costs for DH, 
commercial lenders willing to finance heat networks, and a competitive market in 
specialist consultancies and contractors.  
While the municipal authority played a relatively passive role in early development of 
the system, the state was crucial to the initiative’s success. Licensing reduced the 
importance of a pro-active local authority, and opened up space for the establishment 
of the initiative; it worked to establish legitimate relationships with the local authority 
through planning consent procedures, and the inclusion of a requirement to connect to 
DH in local planning policy. Subsequently, growing interest within Bergen Kommune 
(reflecting growing interest in climate and urban development issues, and recognition 
of local benefits produced by DH) has led to closer collaboration between the DH 
company and municipal authority. The authority now assists BKK Varme to identify 
sites for new energy centres and is committing municipal buildings to the network 
(including retrofitting water borne heating to buildings including the City Hall). The 
heat network has been integrated into the city’s strategic development plan, which is 
aiming to increase urban population density, and to make long-term development of 
heat demand more visible to BKK Varme. Several factors contribute to this change. 
Since around 2007, climate change has become more prominent in Norwegian politics, 
and political interest in urban development in Bergen has also grown. In addition, the 
rapid development of a relatively large DH network is seen as a significant 
achievement, and the success of the system attracts support from subscribers and the 
Bergen Chamber of Commerce. 
In this case, state governance frameworks have regularised DH technology; 
commercial goals tallied with investment in DH, and enabled gains for private energy 
companies in line with their objectives. At the same time, prominent new measures 
for climate protection meant a supportive local authority, gradually creating a 
‘virtuous circle’ of development. 
4.2 ROTTERDAM, Netherlands: from informal knowledge exchange networks to 
private public partnerships via crisis and reform. 
Rotterdam DH development is characterised by hesitant beginnings in the 1970s and 
1980s, when government attempts to encourage DH largely failed (sixteen of fifty 
feasibility studies succeeded) (Raven and Verbong, 2007). This activity, combined 
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with use of DH in an expanded national housing programme in the mid 1990s, 
however, created relevant experience and skills. Energy market liberalisation, and 
consolidation of regional electricity companies (which developed most DH networks), 
in the 1990s stimulated efforts at informal trust-based governance in the early 2000s. 
Finally, after crisis in the late 2000s, a combination of climate change imperatives and 
an influential state heat law (2009) has lead to establishment of a formal institutional 
and oganisational model, based on public-private partnership. State powers to cap 
heat tariffs, on the basis of alternative heating cost and on the basis of reasonable 
returns on infrastructure investment, mitigate both investment and consumer risks of 
DH development in a liberalised energy economy.   
While the Rotterdam Warmtebedrijf initiative is able to draw on established Dutch 
DH praxis, uncertainties over heat sources, costs and necessary expertise have 
precipitated a number of crises and a reconfiguration of the project. The initiative 
aims to bring waste heat from the industrial harbour area into the city. The 
organisational form is complex: there is separation between heat producers, a 
transmission infrastructure operator, a wholesale company which uses the 
transmission infrastructure, and two commercial distribution and retail companies 
(Nuon and Eneco), recruited for their established expertise, and responsible for 
developing the retail market. The municipal authority in turn supports their activity, 
for example through planning powers requiring connection of buildings in DH zones. 
The involvement of Nuon and Eneco, both large companies, is also an important 
factor in mobilising financial resources. The infrastructure is financed by a 70/30 split 
between equity and debt, and commercial lenders were willing originally (prior to 
changes in the initiative discussed below) to lend on the strength of take-or-pay 
contracts with Nuon and Eneco (PVW, 2005). 
Explorations of the use of waste heat date back to industrial ecology programmes in 
the 1990s, and the evolution of the project illustrates the fluidity of governance, which 
has evolved in line with emerging state governance of energy to find a viable local 
model for a embedding DH. Horizontally-structured industrial ecology programmes 
were established initially as industry/academia collaborations, but over time drew in 
regulators, local and regional government and NGOs. The objective was to reframe 
environmental issues as joint problems, rather than sites of antagonism between 
industry and regulators (Baas, 2008). This consensual governance model built trust 
between participants, encouraging plant managers to share operational data which 
underpinned feasibility studies into the use of waste heat. However, as investigations 
coalesced around a model of urban (as opposed to industrial) heat demand, the 
municipal authority began to take a more directive role, for example, requiring that 
open procurement procedures be used to gather competitive bids from industry for the 
supply of heat (Visser, 2008). This may reflect the LA’s role in minimising cost of 
heat to consumers and standard requirements for best value procurement. In addition, 
as in Bergen, climate change mitigation was becoming a prominent political topic as 
Rotterdam joined the C40 cities initiative. The virtues of greater municipal control 
over governance are contested, with some accusations that the trust built among 
participants in the Industrial Ecology programmes was undermined, and that the 
bureaucratic procedures required by the municipal authority slowed the pace of 
development. Nevertheless, as the project progressed, the role of the municipal 
authority has become increasingly central. Two developments precipitated a major 
overhaul of governance. 
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A single publicly-owned company had been planned to develop and operate the 
transmission system, and handle transactions. However, the costs of installing 
equipment at a refinery to allow continued operation in any break in heat network  
business were significantly underestimated. Connection of the refinery was 
abandoned. Separate developments, resulting from overcapacity in Dutch waste 
management infrastructure, led to the relocation of a waste incinerator and 
considerable increases in capital costs, further undermining the plant’s business model. 
Instead, Rotterdam’s municipal waste would be burned in a more distant CHP 
incinerator, and a longer transmission system was required to bring the heat to the city 
centre. 
The municipal authority paused the initiative in 2007 while investigations into a new 
business model were undertaken. There were political divisions as to whether the 
initiative should be abandoned, with arguments centring on the balance between 
losing sunk investments and risks of pressing ahead. The process of developing a new 
business model was therefore subject to considerable political scrutiny. The new 
model drew E.On in as a shareholder, allowing the Warmtebedrijf to exploit E.On’s 
expertise in energy dispatching. E.On sought to shield itself from the risks of 
infrastructure development and operation. The original single heat transmission 
company model was replaced with a two company (infrastructure and commercial 
operations) structure. The new model adopted an innovative approach to heat sales: 
Warmtebedrijf heat is fed into networks previously supplied by E.On’s own (fossil) 
CHP generators. A complex set of calculations governs the process, which is designed 
to make the arrangement profit-neutral to E.On while providing Warmtebedrijf with 
revenue. Although E.On’s involvement is crucial to the new business case, the role of 
the municipal authority has also become central, particularly in mobilising financial 
resources. The municipal authority’s equity investment has risen from €9m to €38m, 
and it now guarantees the commercial loans to the initiative (which have risen from 
€58m to €149.5m, Warmtebedrijf, 2010). The redesigned business model will 
ultimately recover these additional costs from the waste management company 
through lower heat tariffs, but the financial resources and creditworthiness of the local 
authority are crucial. 
The new arrangements for use of industrial waste heat illustrate two general features 
of DH governance: responding to local circumstances and opportunities requires 
innovative organisational and commercial forms; as a consequence, governance may 
entail complex arrangements intended to balance the objectives of the different parties. 
Like the Bergen case, the Warmtebedrijf project illustrates the role of state 
governments in regularising the context for supply and sale of heat via DH. However, 
DH projects continue to require locally-innovative solutions, and technical and 
financial constraints remain significant. In Rotterdam the question of waste heat 
capture from the refinery remains unresolved, although other heat capture 
opportunities have been created through the secure establishment of heat mains 
infrastructure. State, local and private sector interests had to be aligned through 
lengthy negotiation to achieve this outcome. 
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4.3 UK 
4.3.1 Energy Policy and Market Context 
Since the late twentieth century successive UK governments have acted on neo-liberal 
arguments that privatisation and private finance would reduce public expenditure and 
improve efficiency, without degrading public infrastructure, even at a higher cost of 
(commercial rather than public) capital. Higher borrowing cost, it was argued, would 
be more than recovered by resulting lower total expenditure and improved 
performance incentives (Flyvbjerg, 2003; Helm, 2010). Consequently UK energy 
systems and infrastructure are owned and financed largely by the private sector, with 
the UK government acting as market regulator (Helm, 2010). Devolved governments 
in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland can promote energy efficiency and 
renewables through advice and investment, and have some discretion over the 
banding of UK renewable energy incentive payments, but are otherwise bound into 
centrally-regulated markets.  
After a decade of laissez-faire government attitudes to energy planning, top-down 
policy-making returned prominently to the government agendas, prompted by crisis 
over failure to maintain the infrastructure asset base, and by Climate Change 
legislation with ambitious decarbonisation and renewable energy deployment targets. 
It is recognised that transition to a low carbon, secure and affordable energy system is 
unlikely to be manageable under current energy market structures. One of the 
elements in renewed debate over energy planning concerns the potential contribution 
of CHP and DH. Urban heat networks are under consideration as part of a portfolio of 
low carbon energy technologies intended to reduce the risk of over-reliance on any 
single solution, and thus improving competition, innovation and cost saving (DECC, 
2011; HMT National Infrastructure Plan 2011; UK Carbon Plan, 2011). Forthcoming 
Electricity Market Reform (EMR) measures, for low carbon incentive and carbon 
emissions tax payments, set out in the EMR White Paper (UK Government, 2011) 
will however shape economic feasibility and hence the extent of implementation. 
EMR focuses largely on centralised reform of generation and supply, but 
acknowledges that these measures alone are unlikely to be sufficient to produce 
system-wide transition. Distributed energy (DE), with more variety in business 
ownership and investment (PPPs, community interest companies, ESCos set up as 
trading arms of LAs and so on) is envisaged as playing a greater role in what is 
currently a market dominated by six integrated utility companies, which comprise a 
powerful lobbying force in relation to government policy (Mitchell, 2010). DE 
businesses could be developed alongside the ‘Big 6’ as small scale, stand-alone 
community enterprises, with the incumbent ‘regime’ remaining largely unaffected, or 
they may take a range of forms, including joint ventures between utilities, LAs and/or 
other social and commercial enterprises.  The EMR White Paper identifies the 
benefits of a greater role for DE as reduced costs, more diverse, and localised control 
over, supply and potentially a more resilient and secure energy system. There is 
however no settled means to meeting these desired outcomes or generating the 
anticipated investments, and it is unclear to what extent, and how, aspirations to a 
greater contribution from DE will be brought about. This uncertainty is not restricted 
to DE, but reflects a wider lack of clarity regarding the means by which highly 
ambitious policy targets are to be realised in risk-averse and capital constrained times. 
The major focus of policy continues to be low carbon electricity supply, which puts in 
question the strength of commitment to urban heat networks, as opposed to 
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electrification of heat, and there are unresolved issues about the compatibility of these 
different facets of policy.  Hence there remain many questions about whether outline 
policy supportive of DH will result in significant change in practice. In contrast with 
the Netherlands and Norway, where state-level institutions and resources are 
facilitating the development of local networks, the DH TIS in the UK is weakly 
established. In spite of the maturity of DH technologies therefore, and some 
supportive UK and Scottish governance measures, deployment of DH in the UK 
represents a significant collective action problem. 
4.3.2 The Role of LAs in Governance of DH 
Following the European trajectory of DH, local authorities might be expected to have 
a central role in effective governance and leadership, and the UK Government’s 
Infrastructure Plan (2011) identifies LAs as playing a central role in delivery3. At the 
end of 2011, the UK and Scottish governments also published plans to enable certain 
cities to gain greater autonomy and financial powers, in exchange for accelerated 
investment in local economic development4.  The UK local governance context 
differs significantly however from that which supported earlier extensive innovation 
in Europe.  
Whether in England, Scotland or Wales, LAs have limited autonomy; the majority of 
funding is controlled through the respective devolved governments, and they are 
restricted by the ultra vires principle to undertake only those activities permitted by 
statute (although general powers to promote “well being” were introduced in 2000). 
They have restricted trading and revenue raising powers, which constrain their ability 
to provide energy services; they may charge for discretionary services, though only to 
recover the costs of provision. Trading on more commercial terms can be carried out 
through arms length companies, but the higher the degree of LA involvement, the 
tighter the regulation. Until recently local authorities have been allowed to sell 
electricity only when produced in association with heat (and, in Scotland, from waste 
incineration). Partial lifting of this restriction in 2010, allowing sale of electricity 
from renewable sources, opens opportunities for development of a wider portfolio of 
energy services. LAs also have powers centrally relevant to district heating: 
permission5 to produce and sell heat; to lay heat networks and to access pipes for 
maintenance. The powers can be exercised by contractors, or an ESCo, on behalf of 
the LA. Since 2004 LAs have had prudential borrowing powers, giving access to 
lower interest loans for investment, without consent from other levels of government.  
LA duties and plans under climate change legislation, and the introduction of 
‘penalties’ for emissions from energy use, notably the UK CRC, an energy saving ‘tax’ 
on the organisation’s carbon emissions, have created impetus for LAs to reduce their 
own estate energy use, and, more ambitiously, to consider the potential for low-
carbon district energy. Resources are however constrained, plans are mostly at an 
early stage, and capabilities for municipal energy provision are lacking, in the context 
of a centralised, privatised energy system, marked by structural tensions between 
                                                
3 See 3.88-3.90, p.64 
4 UK Government Unlocking Growth in Cities, Dec 2011 www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk; Scottish 
Government Scotland’s Cities, Dec 2011. 
5 The Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 confers these powers on local 
authorities in England and Wales, and amendments to the Local Government (Scotland) Act 
1973 confer the powers in Scotland. 
HAWKEY AND WEBB, DISTRICT HEATING 
 14 
local initiatives and the global scale of energy utilities. Energy consumption data, 
necessary for systematic heat mapping, for example, is dispersed across incumbent 
energy companies, and access is constrained by its status as commercial property.  In 
contrast with many European countries, UK LAs have had virtually no involvement in 
energy provision since nationalisation of the energy industries in the 1940s, and then 
privatisation in the 1990s. Although a number of companies (often local subsidiaries 
of international companies) offer consultancy and contracting services, there is a lack 
of local technical, commercial and project management expertise, and lack of the type 
of local supply chains which arise from involvement of municipalities in energy 
supply. While engineering expertise can be translated from experience in other 
countries, appropriate commercial and legal models are less developed.  
4.3.3 The Current Governance Context: Uncertain Routes to Collective Action 
The absence of a supportive UK multi-level governance ‘template’ leaves space for 
different organisational and business forms to be developed, but makes 
experimentation in development of DH highly challenging. From a TIS perspective, 
this has some positive connotations: a number of local initiatives act as experiments in 
ways of working, contributing to a spectrum of feasible governance structures, from 
community interest companies to PPPs and commercial ESCos. However, the 
perceived risks and uncertainties associated with DH, and the transaction costs arising 
from coordinating multiple stakeholders around an unfamiliar socio-technical system, 
slow the pace of deployment. Key uncertainties are: 
Regulatory: urban heat networks may be subject to future regulation, potentially 
changing the long term performance of business models; 
Financial: high costs of initial infrastructure investment has long-term payback, with 
modest rates of return, and support mechanisms are uncertain; tax advantages for 
electricity from CHP, for example, are due to be revised in 2013, but future schemes 
are yet to be developed; energy price volatility adds uncertainty in calculation of 
expected cash flows; 
Subscriber commitment: perceived risk of long-term supply contracts with a company 
with limited track record, coupled with absence of standardised consumer protections; 
Public procurement and state aid rules: limited experience in energy services 
procurement and limited accessible guidance makes LAs uncertain about effective 
procurement of a commercial DH delivery partner. This is made more complex by LA 
plans to integrate development of DH networks with other low carbon energy 
initiatives; 
Objective-setting: limited LA expertise in DH systems leads to confusion about the 
capabilities of DH, and there may be tensions between social, environmental and 
economic objectives for combating fuel poverty, reducing carbon emissions and 
reducing energy costs/creating new revenue streams for the LA. 
4.3.4 Local Governance Case Studies: Aberdeen, Birmingham and Woking 
ABERDEEN: from fuel poverty to local community interest company for the benefit 
of the citizens of Aberdeen.  
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Political campaigns against fuel poverty in the 1980s eventually led to UK legislation 
for home energy conservation, which in turn enabled Aberdeen City Council (ACC) 
to appoint a housing officer with responsibility for energy conservation. Public 
funding provided a means to carry out an options appraisal of solutions to fuel 
poverty in the worst of the city’s electrically-heated multi-storey residences. The 
study identified gas CHP with DH as achieving the lowest cost in use to residents. 
The ‘cost in use’ assessment criterion, which was justified by the Council’s social 
priorities for affordable warmth, outweighed the conventional ‘lowest cost’ option, 
and Councillors took the politically-courageous decision to proceed against the legal 
advice of the council in-house lawyers. The combination of a determined officer, a 
burst of UK government funding for community energy, access to an informal 
network of community energy expertise, and local political leadership resulted in 
formation of an arms length non-profit ESCo, Aberdeen Heat and Power (AHP), with 
responsibility to act for the good of the citizens of Aberdeen. Several heat networks 
have since been developed, each supplying multi-storey flats, and progressively 
expanding to other municipally-controlled buildings. Networks have been financed by 
local authority housing capital, prudential borrowing against current and future 
expenditures which the initiatives avoid, UK and Scottish government grant funding, 
and a commercial bank loan and overdraft.  
The focus on local authority buildings and social housing enabled the system to 
develop, without the uncertainties introduced by supplying external public or 
commercial organisations. During this period of formation, AHP has developed 
technical and financial expertise. Domestic users receive unmetered supply of heat at 
a fixed cost (paid with rent) reflective of the costs incurred by AHP. AHP and ACC 
now have ambitions to expand supply to commercial organisations. Connection of a 
sports facility, a joint venture between ACC and other public bodies, provides an 
opportunity to develop capacities for such supply (e.g. development of a template 
contract) in a quasi-commercial setting. However, management of bad debt risk is a 
challenging issue, and is likely to require a different organisational form in order to 
protect the LA from liability. 
BIRMINGHAM:  risk aversion, carbon management and local economic 
regeneration via private-public partnership (PPP).  
Fuel poverty in social housing was also the issue which aroused initial DH interest 
among building engineers in Birmingham City Council (BCC). The Council faced a 
series of court cases, brought by tenant campaigners in the 1980s, which resulted in 
orders for improvements in the energy performance of its housing stock. They 
focused however on short term, lowest cost measures (rather than cost in use), which 
led to new electrical heating and improved building insulation. A small scale in-house 
CHP and DH pilot was however established, connecting a local leisure centre to a 
number of multi-storey residences. Building engineers continued to assert the value of 
CHP with DH, despite opposition from Council finance and legal teams. The eventual 
adoption of whole-life-costing accountancy rules, driven by UK government private 
finance and PPP contracts, became a means of justifying subsequent CHP and DH 
investment, when opportunities arose from planned heating boiler replacement at 
Birmingham’s city centre national arena and conference centre. The main objective 
for the project was economic regeneration alongside carbon saving. UK government 
funding for community energy again proved instrumental in gaining Council support. 
Seeking to minimise BCC’s exposure to financial risk, however, and partly inspired 
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by the success of Southampton Geothermal Heating Company, the council procured a 
commercial contractor, Cofely, to build, own and operate three DH networks with gas 
CHP. Cofely established Birmingham District Energy Company (BDEC) as a joint 
venture with the Council, the local university and a hospital. This approach allowed 
public sector partners to draw on Cofely’s access to loan and equity finance through 
parent company GDF-Suez, as well as its experience of network development and 
operation, and of establishing supply contracts with third parties. The networks 
predominantly supply large heat users (BCC, a university, a hotel, an arena, a 
convention centre, and a hospital). The commercial company model results in limited 
motivation to address fuel poverty, which is seen as having high costs and low returns. 
A small number of council owned flats have been connected to the network, but this 
has relied on further grant-funding from UK government.  
Establishing the BDEC model was challenging, as grant funding imposed a deadline 
for negotiations. The steep learning curve and lack of experience of the BCC legal 
team were significant, and both BCC and Cofely worked under pressure in the final 
days up to the deadline. The final procurement agreement is regarded by BCC as too 
tightly specified to allow expansion of the system without a further procurement 
process. In addition, despite caution on the part of BCC, the initiative contravened 
state aid rules, resulting in fines. Nevertheless the model os regarded as highly 
successful and the Council has used the experience to develop ambitious plans for 
city-wide district energy, building on secondary schools as local network hubs, using 
BCC biomass for heating, and investing in energy from waste.  
WOKING: Environmental activism, executive leadership, energy saving, and local 
enterprise ESCos 
Commitment of the Chief Executive and local political support for environmental 
issues made Woking Borough Council (WBC) an early innovator in energy saving 
and DE. WBC began an in-house energy efficiency programme in 1992, setting up a 
£250,000 revolving fund for council estate measures. The success of the programme 
(including small scale CHP) strengthened political support for energy saving, on the 
double benefit of environmental and financial gains. The council sought to develop 
larger scale CHP/DH systems, while reducing its exposure to risk, and complying 
with regulations governing local authority trading. Governance of DE projects is via 
two arms length companies, whose profits are retained by WBC for use in further 
energy saving projects. A wholly owned arms-length company, Thameswey, in turn 
established a joint venture company, Thameswey Energy Limited (TEL), with a 
Danish company. Development of this arrangement was complex: initial support from 
government funding has been extended through prudential borrowing and commercial 
loans. WBC lends to TEL at commercial rates, using the resulting interest payment 
differential to reinvest in further sustainability projects. The model requires TEL to 
behave entrepreneurially, seeking energy investment opportunities outside the 
Borough of Woking. The effort involved in establishing this organisational form is 
expressed in the £2m valuation Thameswey places on the intellectual property. 
TEL developed and operates several CHP/DH schemes, both in Woking and in Milton 
Keynes (about 100km away). By developing a system performance database, and 
recruiting specialist staff, it has built distinctive capacity in energy trading through 
private wires, a virtual private wire arrangement with the area Distribution Network 
Operator, and participation in wholesale market and grid balancing payments.  
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5. Discussion  
As a recognised urban energy saving solution, which is materially, socially and 
economically embedded, the level of district heating development acts as an indicator 
of the quality of governance and sustainability of wider energy systems. Under the 
current UK political-economic settlement, DH innovations struggle to get established: 
intermittent funding has been highly valuable, but project developers face multiple 
sources, and dimensions, of uncertainty: in relation to finance and business viability, 
fragmented governance instruments which send contradictory market signals, and 
weakly-established technical and professional expertise and supply chains. 
Nevertheless, in governance circumstances very different from those which supported 
earlier European development, a number of enterprising and resourceful LA actors 
have established DH projects. They have acted because they have analysed the 
complex interconnecting demands on LAs for carbon reduction, energy saving, 
affordable heating and local economic regeneration. Given the constraints on their 
powers, which limit the scope for more radical action, they have identified local 
energy projects as an innovative way to integrate social, economic and environmental 
goals. Extensive, and creative, work has been done by emergent local leaders, to 
configure project teams, and to negotiate locally-appropriate technical and 
organisational solutions. Governance practices have however been newly constituted 
with each project, in order to fit the matrix of global energy market, local social 
economy and shifting state regulatory frames. What makes local officers and some 
local politicians willing to act against the dominant ‘regime’? In each case, local 
actors have been part of wider professional and informal social networks of expertise, 
which produce commitment to the project: in Woking this stemmed from 
environmental activism; in Aberdeen from fuel poverty campaigns and in 
Birmingham from a commitment to regeneration in a city which prided itself on its 
industrial engineering history. In all cases, local commitment was made consequential 
as a result of the opportunity created by time-limited government funding, but equally 
by the activities of officers in intersecting informal networks of community energy 
expertise, which in turn are strengthened through interaction with decontextualized 
project finance, engineering and procurement bodies. 
In the language of the MLP, this innovation system can to some degree be understood 
as occupying a niche in an unsupportive energy regime, with a shifting landscape 
constituted by political struggle over low carbon energy and urban infrastructures. 
Local Authority DH projects are ‘protected innovation spaces’ in the sense that grant 
funding for part of the costs has enabled creation of a business case. Viable projects 
have to be crafted in the context of dominant processes and practices of evaluation 
which are unsupportive of investment in DH. Public benefit is not an acceptable 
rationale in its own right, but must be carefully translated into the dominant financial 
logic of calculative rationality and risk mitigation. International comparisons show 
that changing the parameters of governance alters the pace and scale of development. 
Over the longer term, changing the parameters of the dominant evaluation framework 
will be critical to secure systematic development of urban heat networks and 
identification of optimal locales. Stronger roles for local and state levels of 
government are therefore important for DH to contribute to system change.  
Governance occurs at a range of nested scales (organisation, municipality, region, 
country, EU) each of which may be variously interpreted as comprising the “system” 
within which innovation has to occur, or the site of a “regime” whose sociotechnical 
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stability represents the context for deployment of DH. Actors are not confined to one 
of these scales or levels: project development and implementation bring local and 
‘cosmopolitan’ interests into structured and (to some degree) spontaneous interaction; 
local governments, state governments, politicians, financiers, transnational and local 
businesses, technical, legal and commercial experts, and publics intersect with each 
other through particular people, in the planning, development and implementation of 
DH projects. Actors are aware of each other, and of the complexity of their roles and 
motivations. They have overlapping or complementary, as well as competing or 
conflicting, agendas and goals. As demonstrated by the case studies, the planning and 
financing of DH projects are framed by the constraints and opportunities of regime 
and landscape, but simultaneously contribute to its structuring and restructuring. 
District heating systems provide particular arenas for combining locally-embedded 
actors and resources, with global flows of financial, legal and technical expertise. 
Summerton (1992) characterised DH systems as part technical, part institutional, as 
examples of grid-based multi-organisations (GBMOs) drawn together in the complex 
interdependence necessary to secure the initial market, professional and institutional 
support structures for the technology, and successful mobilisation and enrolment of 
powerful external interest. The physical grid is paralleled by an "invisible grid", based 
on the interdependence between the different organisations, where more overtly social 
aspects of system building are often more difficult and time consuming than physical 
or technical aspects. Actors seek to mobilise global networks in order to obtain 
resources to build a local project. In line with Law and Callon (1992), we found that 
eventual success, and defining attributes of the system, depended on the constitution 
of two intersecting networks: global finance, political support and technical 
specifications on the one hand, and local commitment, assets and skills on the other. 
Success depends on the degree to which the project can establish itself as an essential 
link between the two worlds; at their intersection a new local network centred on a 
project is created. It has to deliver some degree of reward to the global network of 
interests, but social indeterminacy in the ways in which such networks are connected 
means that the trajectory and relative success of such projects is never 
straightforwardly predictable. 
A focus on situated practices of governance for local DE, does not therefore equate to 
‘the micro-social’ level. The local scale is neither the necessary incubator of socio-
technical innovation in energy systems, nor a bounded stand-alone project in a ‘niche’ 
separated from ‘regime’ and ‘landscape’. Instead energy systems’ innovation 
exercised through specific DE projects is co-produced by state, market and civil 
society actors in structured, but to some degree indeterminate, interaction. From this 
perspective, the micro, meso and macro are each implicated in DH innovations, 
offering a more dynamic and realistic analysis than either top-down or bottom-up 
models. Any DE innovation, however limited in scale, entails decisions about 
allocation of risk and reward, positive and negative ‘externalities’ in relation to 
environment or public health, and terms of access to social goods such as energy. 
These decisions bring local interests into interaction with delocalised, 
decontextualised capital and expertise. They are not decisions amenable to 
technocratic solutions, because they entail political questions about contested 
frameworks of valuation (Helm, 2010). This perspective is in line with a politically-
informed analysis of energy transitions (Shove and Walker, 2007; Smith and Stirling, 
2007), which retains a reflexive and social constructivist perspective on power. There 
is therefore a need for further development of structurally and institutionally informed 
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perspectives on the governance of innovation than those currently offered by 
Transitions Theory and TIS models. The latter under-appreciate the social and 
technical embeddedness of energy systems.  
6. Conclusions: What Forms of Governance? 
What forms of governance would accelerate the deployment of DH networks, with 
what consequences for local control? Different governance models have different 
implications for the DH trajectory, particularly in terms of the identities and 
configurations of central actors, networks, heat sources and users: constructing 
networks in areas of fuel poverty meets social objectives, but brings higher costs and 
risks which commercial actors avoid. Governance options can be conceptualised as 
distributed along a continuum. If the current status quo is regarded as one extreme, 
which can be characterised as ‘governance under uncertainty’, then the opposite end 
of the spectrum might be described as ‘command and control’ governance, which sets 
top-down ‘planned’ measures for take-up of DH in specified zones. ‘Governance 
under uncertainty’ is unlikely to increase the momentum, or result in the provision 
envisaged in even relatively modest government policy for urban heat networks. Each 
project development team have to find discrete solutions through the maze of 
uncertainty with high transaction costs. Risk of failure is high. Ad hoc innovation is 
likely to continue, with reliance on local authorities for project development, situated 
in relation to local contingencies. In the absence of standardised commercial and 
operating models, LA leadership and democratic oversight of urban heat networks is 
essential to mitigating subscriber perceptions of risk. Development however is likely 
to remain small scale and uneven, sub-optimal in technical, economic and social 
terms, and to carry high costs for local actors. Small scale experimentation seems 
unlikely to be sufficient to meet radical decarbonisation targets with tight timetables.  
A ‘command and control’ model of governance has advantages of relative certainty 
for investors, assuming that forms of public guarantee for sunk costs of investment in 
infrastructure could be politically delivered, and that questions of regulation, 
ownership and control could be resolved. This may encourage major utilities or 
‘regime incumbents’ to invest in DH initiatives, and incorporate DH into their 
portfolios. Established DH operators, currently outside the UK energy supply regime, 
may enter the competition, with the effect of adaptation of the dominant regime, 
although mergers and acquisitions in European energy markets suggest that further 
concentration of ownership may also follow. This model seems likely to produce the 
greatest continuity in energy regime actors, and may be necessary, if the statutory 
GHG emissions targets for decarbonising heat supply in the UK are going to be met. 
There are risks associated with ‘command and control’ solutions however, which 
stem from limited sensitivity to local circumstances, potential for perverse incentives 
and ‘rent seeking’ by major businesses, and potentially less than optimal solutions to 
the combined social, environmental and economic goals of sustainable energy.  
As illustrated by the governance solutions devised in the context of liberalised energy 
markets in Norway and the Netherlands, there are intermediary locations along such a 
spectrum. These can be characterised as ‘regularised reflexive governance’ and give 
scope for recognition of polycentric locally-optimised solutions devised by 
constructive meshing of local and global expertise. Scope is retained for empowering 
local actors to shape innovative solutions, while improving inter-municipal learning, 
and reducing uncertainties and transaction costs, in an attempt to streamline 
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development and mobilise investment. Reflexive governance which is able to 
encompass different scales of urban DH systems, and public interest goals, including 
retaining revenues in the local economy, is however under-developed. Changing the 
regulatory parameters can reshape the risk calculus, by for example integrating social 
and environment goods into dominant financial evaluation practices, as practiced 
under the Norwegian DH licensing model. ‘Regularised’ reflexive governance, which 
seeks to devolve control and resources in a cohesive policy framework, yet without 
determining outcomes, may be the most effective route to a more resilient low carbon 
energy system, which minimises ‘stranded assets’, edits out poor quality systems, and 
is encompasses social and environmental values. It should also enable accelerated 
transferable learning between projects and shared standard templates for legal 
compliance. It retains the value of the LA, with long-term commitment to the area, 
local democratic participation, and local knowledge, acting potentially as a quasi-
regulator, to reduce downstream transaction costs, improve systems design and 
energy saving, and give clarity to the implications of different control and ownership 
arrangements.  
The dilemma faced by central, devolved and local governments therefore is how to 
coordinate action to devise intelligent regulatory measures, which neither exclude 
local economic interests and potential for the public good in secure and affordable 
heating, nor lose the public value embedded in resources and capacities, which the 
major utilities can bring to bear in constituting a sustainable energy system. 
Regularising governance may enable a constructive transition pathway, to the extent 
that ‘regime’ configurations are subject to engagement and democratic scrutiny, 
beyond the ‘engineered’ and bureaucratically-determined configuration of technical 
artefacts. The struggle over a governance model to enable scaling-up of urban DH, as 
an appropriate contributor to UK energy systems, will be played out between the 
incumbent interests of utilities, based on sunk investments in infrastructure, 
contractors who control legal, technical and financial expertise, and municipal and 
state governments, with their mixed competing and collaborative interests in public 
goods and private profit. 
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